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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The current economic times have had repercussions on businesses large and
small. Businesses have dealt with these factors in numerous ways, including filing for
bankruptcy protection, either to reorganize or to liquidate the business. In this new
era, many provisions in business arrangements are under increased scrutiny. Lowincome housing transactions have not been exempt from the issues arising from the
changing financial climate. Elements of these transactions are carefully negotiated,
particularly where the general partners or managing members responsible for the
development and operation of the project are two or more joint venturers.
On January 1, 1987, the low-income housing tax credit (the “LIHTC”)
became effective pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“TRA”).1 Congress
designed the LIHTC to provide an incentive for developers and investors in the
form of an indirect federal subsidy to be used in financing low-income housing,
thereby resulting in more affordable residential rental units.2 The LIHTC program
eased the government’s burden to provide housing by shifting the support of crucial
urban redevelopment and renewal projects to private investors.3 Additionally,

* Visiting Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law, Spring 2010. J.D., Golden Gate
University School of Law, B.A. Sonoma State University. Carolyn A. Rowland is currently a principal
of Rowland Law LLC. She was formerly a partner with Bryan Cave LLP. The author is very grateful
to Professor George W. Kuney for his thoughtful comments and guidance. She also thanks Wendy
Godfrey for her excellent research assistance.
1

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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See I.R.C. § 42 (2009).
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Congress included a set-aside for qualifying non-profit organizations to further
encourage development.4
The subsidy is based on a percentage of certain costs.5 Specifically, it is a
30% subsidy for new construction and the costs of the acquisition of existing
buildings for rehabilitation6 or a 70% subsidy for new construction projects that do
not already receive other federal subsidies.7
While the LIHTC program is a federal program set forth in section 42 of the
Internal Revenue Code, as amended (“IRC”) (“Section 42”), each state is allocated a
specified dollar amount for a tax credit ceiling for each calendar year.8 The
respective state housing credit agency is then responsible for creating and
administering its own program for the allocation of the LIHTC.9 Each state creates
a qualified allocation plan (“QAP”) for administering the LIHTC program, which
sets forth the criteria for applications and other matters.10 Each state is also

4

Id. at § 42(I)(5).

5

Id. at § 42(b). The amount of the LIHTC is calculated using the “applicable percentage” of the
“qualified basis” of each “qualified low-income building.” Each of these terms has a specific meaning
set forth in I.R.C. § 42, as further defined in Treasury Regulations, Revenue Rulings, and private letter
rulings. For purposes of this article, I did not attempt to define these further since the focus relates to
a specific aspect of section 42 and non-profit organizations’ involvement in LIHTC developments.

6

Id. at § 42(b)(1)(B)(i).

7

Id. at § 42(b)(1)(B).

8

Id. at § 42(h)(3)(C).

9

Id. at § 42(h)(3). See subsection (C) for the formula for calculating a state’s housing credit ceiling.

10

Id. at § 42(m)(1)(B). A qualified allocation plan means any plan:
(i)

which sets forth selection criteria to be used to determine housing priorities of the
housing credit agency which are appropriate to local conditions,

(ii)

which also gives preference in allocating housing credit dollar amounts among
selected projects to –
(I) projects serving the lowest income tenants,
(II) projects obligated to serve qualified tenants for the longest periods, and
(III) projects which are located in qualified census tracts (as defined in subsection
[I.R.C. § 42](d)(50(C)) and the development of which contributes to a concerted
community revitalization plan, and

(iii)

which provides a procedure that the agency (or an agent or other private contractor
of such agency) will follow in monitoring for noncompliance with the provisions of
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responsible for monitoring compliance with the low-income use requirements.11
Further, under Section 42 and within the QAP, the State housing credit agency must
“set aside” at least ten percent of its housing credit ceiling to projects involving
qualified non-profit organizations.12
While many issues arise with joint ventures between non-profits and forprofit entities, there are advantages for both types of entities in LIHTC housing
developments. Allocations under the LIHTC are awarded under a competitive
process. A for-profit developer can enhance its chances for receiving such an award
by partnering with a qualified non-profit organization. For the non-profit
organization, which may be unable, on its own, to provide the necessary financial
requirements or have the staffing necessary for development, partnering allows more
participation in fulfilling the non-profit’s mission of providing more affordable
housing.13 However, this joint venture raises a new set of issues, including taxexempt-use property concerns and the rights of the parties if one of the partners

this section and in notifying the Internal Revenue Service of such noncompliance
which such agency becomes aware of and in monitoring for noncompliance with
habitability standards through regular site visits.
Id.
11

Id. at § 42(f)(10). The tax credits are generally claimed over a ten year period; however, the project
must comply with the low income use requirements for 15 years (and usually 30 years if a longer
extended use period was elected under the application) as set forth in the extended use agreement
recorded and encumbering the real property (the “15 year compliance period”).

12

Id. at § 42(h)(5)(A), (C). A “qualified nonprofit organization” means any organization that meets
the following criteria:
(i)

such organization is described in paragraph (3) or (4) of [I.R.C.] section 501(c) and
is exempt from tax under [I.R.C.] section 501(a),

(ii)

such organization is determined by the State housing credit agency not to be
affiliated with or controlled by a for-profit organization; and

(iii)

[one] of the exempt purposes of such organization includes the fostering of lowincome housing.

Id. at § 42(h)(5)(C).
13

There are many non-profit organizations that have the capabilities to serve as the developer and
the general partner, and, in those instances, there is no need for a joint venture. Those types of
developments are outside of the scope of this article. However, a non-profit may choose to form a
joint venture in order to expand the number of developments, thereby furthering their mission and
purposes.
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becomes insolvent and seeks protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code
(the “Bankruptcy Code”).14 This article attempts to review the current structure used
by many joint ventures with for-profit and non-profit partners and analyzes the
bankruptcy protections between such partners.
In this article, Part II details the structure of an LIHTC project. Part III
contains illustrative provisions typically found in limited partnership and operating
agreements. Part IV applies the provisions in Part III to a factual narrative of the life
of a LIHTC project. Part V examines what constitutes an executory contract. Parts
VI, VII and VIII examine whether a Managing Member Operating Agreement is an
executory contract, whether the right of first refusal in such an operating agreement
is enforceable and whether an option provision in such an operating agreement is
enforceable, respectively. Finally, Part IX considers the usefulness of these types of
provisions.

II.

THE STRUCTURE

In the most basic sense, an LIHTC project is a real estate project. Generally,
the preferred ownership entity is either a limited partnership or a limited liability
company (“LLC”).15 The party submitting the LIHTC application to the state
agency typically acts as the general partner in the case of the limited partnership, or
the managing member in the case of the LLC.16 An investor who owns the largest
interest in the limited partnership or LLC normally acts as the limited partner.17

14

Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.C.).

15

Jeffery R. Pankratz & Craig A. Emden, Section 704(B) Regulation and Tax Credit Transactions: Structuring
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Transactions to Avoid Reallocations of Tax Credits and Losses, 11 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 339, 339 (Summer 2002). The use of a limited partnership or
a limited liability company allows of the gains, losses and tax credits to “pass-through” to the partners
or members.
16

Cf. Nancy Bernstine and Irene Basloe Saraf, New Rental Production and the National Housing Trust Fund
Campaign, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 389, 400 (Summer 2003). In this article, I use
the terms “general partner” and “managing member” interchangeably because they usually serve the
same roles in the ownership entity. In addition, state statutes govern the organization of the entities
and should be considered in the structuring process.

17

Sharon C. Park, Material on Federal Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CLE 809, 836
(2001). The investor’s role in these developments is to provide equity in return for an allocation of
the LIHTC profits and losses. This equity provides a needed funding source that does not incur
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Affiliates of the for-profit organization may also have other roles such as developer
or management agent.18
When a qualified non-profit organization is involved, the non-profit may be
part of the ownership of the general partner or managing member, or may be an
“administrative general partner” or a “special member.”19 In this instance, subsidies
or federal loan programs may require that the non-profit organization be “in
control” or own a specific percentage of the controlling party of the limited
partnership/LLC. Both alternatives meet this requirement.
In addition, the qualified non-profit organization may be part of the
developer entity or may be a co-developer.20 The development fee charged is
typically calculated as a percentage of the total development costs (usually between
10% and 15%), is earned by completion of construction, and is paid partially during
construction with the balance with cash flow from operations. This fee represents
compensation to the parties for developing the project from conception through
completion. A non-profit organization that is involved in the development may be
entitled to share in that fee.21
Further, because ownership by the qualified non-profit organization in the
general partner may create “tax exempt use property,”22 the non-profit organization

interest like a loan does and is therefore viewed as less expensive funding with no debt service to
burden a development.
18

Steven P. Berman, Tax Aspects of General Partner Guarantees, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV.
L. 366, 366 (Summer 1999).
19

Park, supra note 17, at 836. While there are structures with the qualified non-profit organization or
its taxable subsidiary as an administrative general partner, most projects have a single general partner,
which is a joint venture of the for-profit and non-profit organizations.

20

Sharon C. Park, Material on Federal Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CLE 917, 100304 (2007).

21

The amount of development fee and the amount that can be deferred and paid after construction
are determined in part by the governing state QAP, the lender requirements and the investor
requirements. The limitations and requirements of the governing state are set forth in the yearly
QAPs. See, e.g. Georgia Department of Community Affairs 2010 Qualified Allocation Plan,
Developer Fee Limitation, at 22; Tennessee Housing Development Agency Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit 2010 QAP, Part V, Section A, Limit on Developer Fee and Consultant Fee, at 7.
22

I.R.C. § 168(h) (2009). Tax exempt use property has implications on how the assets are depreciated.
Residential rental property (not including the personal property and other assets that are separate
categories from the building) is generally depreciated in an accelerated manner over 27.5 years. Unless
a taxable subsidiary is utilized in the ownership (with the appropriate election made under I.R.C. §
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may form or use a taxable subsidiary, completely owned by the qualified non-profit
organization23 to hold the interest in the general partner. The choice here depends
on whether the property is being depreciated over a 40-year or 27.5-year depreciation
schedule. As the yield to the investor is partially driven by losses from depreciation,
this can affect pricing and in a transaction where the property is depreciated on a
27.5-year schedule, the investor will require qualified allocations24 or that a taxable
subsidiary be included in the ownership structure. However, the formation of a
taxable subsidiary (and the filing of the appropriate election under I.RC. Section
168(h)(6)) has tax implications to the non-profit organization since any income from
the taxable subsidiary would be unrelated business income, which the non-profit
organization should take into consideration.25

168(h)), a portion of the depreciation of the building will shift to a 40-year depreciation schedule. The
shift reduces the losses, thereby affecting the yield to the investor limited partner and creating a
similar reduction in the price paid for the LIHTC.
23

For purposes of this article, I did not distinguished between the qualified non-profit and its taxable
subsidiary because any bankruptcy of the parent non-profit would likely involve the taxable subsidiary,
and the results would not vary substantially from the analysis set forth herein.
24

See I.R.C. § 168(h)(6)(B). This section defines a qualified allocation as any allocation to a non-profit
organization entity which is consistent with such entity being allocated the same distributive share of
each item of income, gain, loss, deduction, credit and basis and such share remains the same during
the entire period the entity is a partner in the partnership, and has substantial economic effect within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). Id. This means that if there is a non-qualified allocation that the
non-profit organization would receive, or would be entitled to receive, then its proportionate share of
the property, equal to its highest share of any such items, would be classified as tax-exempt property
and would have to be depreciated over a 40 year schedule.
For example, if the non-profit organization would receive a .5% interest of all items of
income, loss, deduction, credit and basis and would also receive .5% of residual upon sale (and there
are no other items that the non-profit organization shares in that would be considered in this
analysis), then the allocations are likely qualified. However, using the same facts, but changing the
residual so that the non-profit organization receives 50% of the general partner’s interest (and
assuming the general partner receives a 50% residual interest), then the non-profit organization is
receiving a 25% allocation of an item and the allocations are non-qualified. In that instance, 25% of
the building basis would have to be depreciated on a 40 year schedule and75% of the building basis
would be depreciated on a 27.5 year schedule.

25

I.R.C. § 513(a). Unrelated business income is defined as income derived from (i) a trade or
business, (ii) which is regularly carried on, and (iii) which is not substantially related to the
performance of tax-exempt functions, i.e., it does not significantly contribute to the achievement of
tax-exempt purposes. Id. The fact that income was produced for use in furthering exempt purposes
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Once the structure is determined, the parties must negotiate the governing
documents. In transactions with more than one principal party in the general
partner, the parties must resolve how transfers will be handled, including, for
example, (i) a transfer resulting from a bankruptcy or (ii) a transfer that is
precipitated by a need or want of the non-profit to transfer its interest.26 As forprofit and non-profit organizations usually take great care to evaluate their partners
prior to entering into the transaction, controlling how, when, and whether a transfer
may be made is a crucial consideration.27 The provisions governing these types of
situations have been more closely scrutinized due to the current financial
environment in which bankruptcy filings, including non-profit organizations’
bankruptcy filings, have increased.28
The following represent examples of the types of provisions normally found
in a limited partnership agreement or operating agreement, including: (1) a protective
provision to ensure that interests are not transferred freely, thereby allowing the
parties to carefully chose their partners; (2) a provision setting forth how offers
received for interests are reviewed and the rights of the other partners in such event,
and (3) a provision on how to handle dissolutions, death, and bankruptcy
occurrences. Note that as the Section 42 allocation (made from the non-profit setaside) requires material participation29 by the non-profit organization throughout the

does not qualify the income as related; the income itself must be derived in the course of furthering an
exempt purpose. Id.
26

See infra Illustrative Provisions 1.5 and 1.6.

27

See infra Illustrative Provision 1.6.

28

According to the American Bankruptcy Institute, business filings for the 3-month period ending
March 31, 2008, totaled 8,713, up 38.7% from the 6,280 business bankruptcy cases filed in the same
period in 2007. John Hartgen, Total Bankruptcies Increase Nearly 27 Percent Over First Quarter 2007, ABI
NEWSLETTER
UPDATE,
June
3,
2008,
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM
/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=53093.
29

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T (1996) provides rules for determining the material participation for
individuals. I.R.C. § 469(h)(4) and Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(g)(3) (2002) provide rules for determining
the material participation of certain corporations. The rules provided help for illustration purposes,
but, because neither of these provisions directly applies to non-profit organizations, practitioners
should use the general facts and circumstances test of I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) when considering the
applicability to non-profit organizations.

For purposes of the set-aside requirement, the non-profit organization must have an ownership
interest in the project throughout the fifteen-year compliance period and must participate not only in
the development but in the on-going operation of the project. This includes a requirement under
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15 year compliance period, there are further restrictions on transfers directly relating
to this requirement in sections 1.5(B) and 1.6(C) below. Failure to comply with the
Section 42 requirements can result in a recapture of the LIHTC30 and is therefore an
important element of any transfer scenario. Moreover, there are two types of rights
in these transactions: 1) a right of first refusal in the event of a bona fide third party
offer, and 2) an option to purchase in certain instances. Both types of rights will be
considered in the analysis. Finally, these particular rights are generally found in the
operating agreement governing the two joint venturers; however, it is possible that
one or both might be contained in a separate agreement. Therefore, the analysis that
follows will consider this aspect as well.


I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) that the nonprofit participate on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis. Further,
the analysis regarding whether there is material participation is a facts and circumstances analysis
involving the following:
a)

participation in the activity for more than 500 hours during the year;

b)

where the individual’s participation was substantially all of the participation of all
individuals in the activity during the year; and

c)

participation in the activity for more than 100 hours during the year if the individual
participated more than anyone else.

Id. at § 1.469-5T(a)(1-3).
30

Recapture results in a loss of LIHTC that have been or would have been allocated to the partners.
I.R.C. § 42(J) (2009). In LIHTC transactions, guaranties against recapture are heavily negotiated
provisions, and, if there is recapture, it is not uncommon for the general partner or managing
member (and its partners or members) to have the responsibility to compensate the other partner or
member for the loss of the LIHTC that the other partner or member will incur due to the recapture.
Id.
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ILLUSTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Transfers.
1.1 Prohibition Against Transfers.
A Member may sell, transfer, assign, dispose of, mortgage, hypothecate, or
otherwise encumber or permit or suffer any encumbrance of all or any portion of the
Member’s Membership Interest (each a “Transfer”) only if the Member has first
complied with the provisions of this Section 1; in the event such provisions have not
been complied with or such Transfer is prohibited, such Transfer of a Membership
Interest shall be void ab initio. Transfers of any equity or beneficial interest in a
Member shall be deemed to be a Transfer for purposes of this Section 1.
1.2 Third Party Offer.
A. In the event that a Member receives a bona fide offer (as defined below)
from a Third Party Offeror (as defined below) for all or any part of such
Member’s interest as a Member in the Company (the “Third Party Offer”),
which such Member is willing to accept, the Company receiving the Third
Party Offer shall promptly notify the other Members in writing. The other
Members shall have thirty (30) days from the date of such notice (“Election
Period”) in which to elect to purchase the offering Member’s Membership
Interest which was the subject of the Third Party Offer at a price equal to
that, and on the same terms as those, contained in the Third Party Offer. If
more than one Member accepts said offer, the Membership Interest shall be
allocated among the Members so accepting in accordance with their
respective Percentages of Company Interest.


31

The provisions set forth in this article are illustrative only. Each operating agreement will differ.
However, these serve to provide some reference point from which to conduct the analysis and
discussion in this article. While these have been taken from real agreements, the provisions have
been modified to facilitate the discussion. Any agreement between the two joint ventures may contain
all or some portion of these provisions.
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B. If an offering Member does not receive an election from the other Members
to purchase the entire Membership Interest offered for sale by it within the
Election Period, then the offering Member shall be at liberty within a period
of three (3) months from the last date of the Election Period to consummate
the sale to the Third Party Offeror at a price and upon terms not more
advantageous to the Third Party Offeror than the price and terms stated in
the original offer by the Third Party Offeror and submitted to the other
Members. If, however, such sale to the Third Party Offeror is not
consummated within such three (3) month period, then any subsequent sale
to any outside offeror shall also be subject to all the requirements of this
Section 1.2.

C. In the event that the other Members elect to purchase the entire
Membership Interest offered for sale, then the transfer thereof and the
closing of the transaction shall occur thirty (30) days after the exercise of the
option to buy the Membership Interest, unless a different closing date is
specified in the Third Party Offer, in which event such date shall be the
closing date. The closing date shall take place at the office of the attorney
for the offering Member, at which time and place the purchase price shall be
paid in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Third Party Offer,
and the necessary and appropriate instruments of transfer reasonably
required by the purchasing Members shall be executed and delivered by the
offering Member. All closing costs of the consummation of such
transaction shall be equally divided between the offering Member on the one
hand and the purchasing Members on the other hand (other than attorneys’
fees which shall be borne by the party incurring them).

D. Every offer between the Members in accordance with this [Operating]
Agreement shall be in writing, sent by certified or registered mail, return
receipt requested; it shall contain an offer to sell to the offerees all of the
offering Member’s Membership Interest in the Company at a price equal to
the price and upon the same terms contained in the Third Party Offer, and
shall be accompanied by a copy of the Third Party Offer, which shall set
forth the name, home address, business address and business of the outside
offeror. Such Third Party Offer, in order to be a bona fide offer within the
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meaning of this Section, must be in writing, signed by the Third Party
Offeror [who must be one or more persons (including entities) financially
capable of carrying out the terms of the offer], must be in a form legally
enforceable against the Third Party Offeror, and must be accompanied by a
good faith deposit equal to at least five percent (5%) of the proposed
purchase price. A Third Party Offeror may be any person not specified in
Section 1.5.

E. If the Membership Interest of any Member shall be transferred for any
reason other than for reasons specified in Section 1.6(A) and 1.6(B), whether
voluntary or involuntary, including, without limitation, a transfer made as a
result of a pledge of any Membership interest becoming an absolute
assignment, or in execution of a judgment by a judgment creditor, such
transfer shall be subject to the provisions of Section 1.2 hereof such that the
non-transferring Members shall have a right of first refusal; the same
procedures shall apply as set forth above regarding sale of the property. The
sale pursuant to the rights of the pledgor, creditor or otherwise shall be
deemed to be a “Third Party Offer” for purposes of this Section 1.2, and the
other Members shall have the rights set forth in this Section 1.2 to purchase
such Membership Interests, at the same price as that established by the sale.

1.3 Transfer of Member’s Membership Interest.
Subject to Sections 1.5 and 1.6 below, a Member may not Transfer any of
such Member’s Membership Interest without first obtaining the written consent of
the Manager, in the Manager’s sole and absolute discretion.
1.4 No Right to Withdraw.
No Member shall have the right to withdraw from the Company without the
prior written consent of all Members in their sole discretion, and any such purported
withdrawal without consent shall be void ab initio.
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1.5. Permitted Assignments.
Notwithstanding the provisions of 1.1., 1.2, or 1.3, but subject to Section 1.8,
all or any part of the Membership Interest of any Member in the Company or in the
property and assets of the Company, may be Transferred or disposed of by
instrument or instruments, inter vivos or testamentary, to any of the following:
A. A person or entity already a Member; and
B. A business entity which is controlled by any member or members and in
which one or more Members has at least a majority ownership interest;
provided, however, that during the tax credit compliance period for the
project,
[name of qualified non-profit
[name of project]
or taxable subsidiary]
shall not transfer any of its ownership
interest to an entity which would cause a tax exempt use property issue
.
for [owner entity name]
1.6

Permitted Assignment of Membership Interest Upon Death, Dissolution,
Insanity, Incompetency, or Bankruptcy.32
A. In the event of the death, dissolution, or adjudication of insanity or
incompetency of a Member, the executors or administrators of the estate
of the deceased Member, or the committee or other legal representatives
of the estate of the insane or incompetent Member, or the successors in
interest of the dissolved Member shall, for the purpose of settling the
estate, have all the rights of the Member, including the rights (subject to
the same limitations) that the deceased, dissolved, insane, or incompetent
Member would have had under the provisions of this Section 1 to
Transfer the Membership interest of the deceased, insane, dissolved, or
incompetent Member and to provide in the instrument of Transfer that


32

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay which is applicable to all
entities and prevents the obtaining of any property of the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate, without relief granted by the court. In the event of a bankruptcy filing, the appropriate
petition for relief from stay would need to be filed. In filing such a petition, the other partner or
member would want to provide the court with information on the sales price (i.e., the calculation if set
forth in the applicable agreement and any appraisal which might reflect the purchase price) as well as
the anticipated losses from recapture (which would then be a claim against the estate).
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the transferee may become a substituted Member in accordance with the
provisions specified in this Section 1.
B. If any Member shall take advantage of any bankruptcy or insolvency act,
or if a bankruptcy or insolvency petition shall be filed against any
member and a final adjudication of bankruptcy or insolvency entered
thereon, or if a member shall make a general assignment for the benefit
of such Member’s creditors or take advantage or be subjected to any
similar creditor’s rights laws, the Manager shall have the option
(exercisable by giving notice thereof to such bankrupt or insolvent
Member or such Member’s assignee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver,
executor, personal representative, or other legal representative) to
purchase all (but not less than all) of such Member’s Membership
Interest (and assets distributable to such member on dissolution of the
Company), within ninety (90) days after delivery of such notice, and at a
price equal to the fair market value thereof at such time. The fair market
value shall be the amount to which the parties agree. If the parties
cannot agree upon a price within thirty (30) days from the date the
Members elect so to purchase, the fair market value shall be determined
by appraisal. Such appraisal shall be conducted by a committee of three
(3) appraisers, each of whom shall be a member of the American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers (M.A.I.), chosen as follows: One such
appraiser shall be chosen by the purchaser, a second appraiser shall be
chosen by the seller, and the third appraiser shall be chosen by the two
appraisers chosen as aforesaid. If either party does not select an
appraiser within thirty (30) days after the date of the election and
direction from the other party to so select an appraiser, then an appraiser
will be selected for that party within an additional ten (10) days by the
other party. Each appraiser shall make an independent appraisal, and, if
there is more than one appraiser, the fair market value shall be the
average of the two (2) appraisals closest in value. Expenses of appraisers
shall be borne by the respective parties choosing the appraiser, expect
that the expenses of the third appraiser shall be borne one-half (1/2) by
the seller and one-half (1/2) by the purchaser. For purposes hereof, the
appraisers shall take into account the status and import of then current
negotiations and/or agreements concerning offers, sale, leases, plans and
specifications, financings and joint venture agreements, and other
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relevant factors, all of which shall be made available to the parties and the
appraisers. If the option is exercised, settlement shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the date of such exercise. The terms of payment
shall be all cash.

C. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section 1.6, during the
tax credit compliance period for the
[name of project]
project,
[name of qualified non-profit or taxable subsidiary]
shall not transfer any of its ownership interest to an entity which would
cause a tax exempt use property issue for [owner entity name] .
1.7 Right to Become a Member.
In addition to satisfying the other provisions of this Section 1, the assignee of
a Member’s Membership Interest shall become a Member only if (1) the assigning
Member so provides in the instrument of assignment, and (2) the assignee agrees in
writing to be bound by the provisions of this Operating Agreement, as amended, and
to enter into any agreement contemplated by this Operating Agreement, and (3) if
applicable under Section 1.3, the Manager consents. If the assigning Member so
provides, the assignee shall have the right to become a Member upon payment to the
Company of all costs and expenses of preparation and execution of an amendment
to this Operating Agreement. In such event, the Manager shall prepare or cause to
be prepared an amendment to this Operating Agreement to be signed by each of the
Members, by the assigning member, and by the assignee. If an assignee of a
Member’s Membership Interest is not admitted as a Member, such assignee
nevertheless shall be entitled to receive those distributions from the Company as the
assigning Member would have been entitled to receive had the assigning Member
retained such Membership Interest. Such assignee shall have no rights in the
governance of the Company unless and until the assignee is admitted as a Member
pursuant to the terms of this Operating Agreement.
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1.8 Further Restrictions on Transfers.
Any Transfers of a Membership Interest shall be further conditioned upon
the satisfaction of the following conditions: secure satisfactory opinion of counsel,
register under applicable federal or state securities laws, refrain from causing a
termination of the Company under Section 7098 of the Internal Revenue Code,
refrain from causing the Company to be classified as any entity other than a
partnership for federal income tax purposes.
1.9 Membership Interest as Security.
No Member may collaterally assign all or any portion of such Member’s
Membership Interest as security for an obligation without the consent of the
Manager, which may be granted or withheld in the Manager’s sole and absolute
discretion.

IV.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS33

For purposes of illustrating the application of the above-described
provisions, suppose that a for-profit organization and a non-profit organization have
entered into a business arrangement to provide low-income housing, and they have
received an LIHTC allocation. Assume that an investor has agreed to become part
of the ownership structure, and the organizational documents for the owner entity
and the general partner entity have been negotiated. Further, assume that the general
partner is an LLC consisting of the for-profit organization and the non-profit
organization, and provisions similar to those detailed above are included in the
operating agreement governing the general partner entity. The LIHTC project is
constructed or rehabilitated and is now operational. All is well until the non-profit
organization encounters some unexpected financial issues. The Executive Director
of the non-profit organization telephones the president of the for-profit organization
to advise him or her that the non-profit will be filing for bankruptcy protection.
Most likely, the president will then ask legal counsel what this means for the
organization and what its rights are.

33

Note that the option and the right of first refusal in the above provisions may have a price below
market or a set price determined at the time the agreements are negotiated and executed. This factor
should be taken in account in considering the analysis below.
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For businesses, filing for bankruptcy takes the form of either a Chapter 11
filing (a reorganization in which the filing entity will generally emerge from
bankruptcy or, if not, may convert to a Chapter 7 filing) or a Chapter 7 filing (a
liquidation of the filing entity).34 A bankruptcy filing has many implications in a
business transaction, but the issue addressed in this article is whether the operating
agreement, (or a right of first refusal or option agreement if the provisions above
have been memorialized in separate agreements), is an executory contract whereby
the non-profit organization, as debtor (if under Chapter 11) or trustee (if under
Chapter 7) has the discretion to assume or reject the executory contract.35

V.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT?

Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly define the term
“executory contract,” the legislative history of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
states: “[t]hough there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it
generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on
both sides.”36
However, if the legislative history is taken literally, almost all
agreements would be considered executory in nature due to unperformed obligations
on either side.37 The definition is effectively narrowed by consulting the case law of
the jurisdiction in which the bankruptcy case is filed. Although this article does not
address all circuits’ points of view (and some circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit, have
very little case law on the issue), most circuits, including the Second,38 Third, and
Fourth Circuits, use the Countryman standard in considering whether an agreement
is an executory contract.39

34

11 U.S.C. §§ 701-707, 1101-1116 (2006).

35

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) states that the “trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” Id.

36

S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5693, 6303.

37

In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 190 B.R. 741, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Bluman, 125 B.R.
359, 361-62 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).
38

See In re Bradlees Stores, Inc., No. 00-16033, 2001 WL 1112308 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (noting that
the Second Circuit has also tested agreements under a more flexible “functional approach”).

39

See, e.g., In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re W. Chestnut Realty of
Haverford, Inc., 177 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Hardie, 100 B.R. 284, 286 n.3 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989) for the discussions of the applicable standards in each Circuit.
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The Countryman standard is based on Professor Countryman’s definition of
an executory contract: a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt
and the other party to the contract are so far underperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
performance of the other.40 Case law provides numerous approaches for analyzing
the existence of an executory contract examining whether the contract in question
(1) is a prepetition contract where both sides are still obligated to render substantial
performance,41 (2) requires performance on only one side, rendering it nonexecutory,42 (3) is examined as a matter of state law,43 and (4) is subject to applicable
non-bankruptcy law permitting either party to sue for breach because of the other
party’s failure to perform, thus making the contract executory.44 Generally, the
executory nature of a contract is determined as of the petition date of the bankruptcy
filing.45
However, some courts have found the “material breach” test of Countryman
too constraining and static.46 In response, these courts have moved to a functional
analysis that removes the executory requirement.47 Under a functional analysis
approach, courts focus on the benefit to the estate, finding that “the question of

40

Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy; Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973); accord
Enter. Energy Corp. v. United States (In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.), 50 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1995);
Cameron v. Pfaff Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 966 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Streets & Beard
Farm P’ship, 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); Pac. Express, Inc. v. Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In
re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 193 B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re 375 Park Ave. Assocs.,
Inc., 182 B.R. 690, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 851 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. 335, 344-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
41

In re Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 239; In re Streets & Beard, 882 F.2d at 235; In re 375 Park Ave. Assocs.,
182 B.R. at 697.

42

In re Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. at 345.

43

In re Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 240 n.10.

44

In re Streets & Beard, 882 F.2d at 235.

45

In re Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 240.

46

Jessica L. Kotary & Nicole L. Inman, Note, Eliminating “Executory” from Section 365: The National
Bankruptcy Review Commission’s Panacea for an Ailing Statute, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 513, 519 n.46
(1997).
47

Id. at 517.
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whether a contract is executory is determined by the benefits that assumption or
rejection would produce for the estate.”48 This test allows the court to consider how
burdensome the contract would be on the estate in determining whether the contract
is executory.49 If the court determines that the contract is burdensome, then the
court is more likely to find that the contract is executory and that the debtor may
reject it.50
There is no uniformly applied rule to the executory contract issue, as not all
courts use the functional analysis approach. Some courts consider what objective
the rejection of the contract is expected to accomplish. For example, “If [the]
objectives have already been accomplished, or [if they] can[not] be accomplished
through rejection, then [the] contract is not executory.”51 On the other hand, some
courts consider the purposes of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code52 in determining
whether a contract is executory. In some instances, courts have analyzed contracts
under both the Countryman standard and the functional approach.53


48 Sipes v. Atl. Gulf Cmtys. Corp. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.), 84 F.3d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996)
(affirming on the basis of the district court’s opinion in 177 B.R. 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1995)); accord, Cohen
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 138 B.R. 637, 696
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
49

Kotary & Inman, supra note 46, at 517.

50

In re Worldcom, Inc., 343 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).

51

See, e.g., Chattanooga Mem’l Park v. Still (In re Jolly) 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 929 (1978) (a pre-Bankruptcy Code case).

52

See., e.g., In re Leibinger-Roberts, Inc., 105 B.R. 208, 211 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (The court
collapsed the executory and functional analyses in stating that “when a debtor cannot reap any present
or future benefits from a contract due to a change in circumstance, the contract’s life as an executory
contract comes to an end and the contract becomes unilateral and enforceable against the parties in
the absence of a valid defense.”).

53

Shoppers World Ctr., L.P. v. Bradlees Stores, Inc. (In re Bradlees Stores, Inc.), No. 00-16033, 2001
WL 1112308, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001).
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IS THE MANAGING MEMBER OPERATING AGREEMENT AN
EXECUTORY CONTRACT?

LLCs are a relatively new type of business entity.54 In 1997, Wyoming was
the first state to pass a statute creating LLCs. But the LLC entity did not become
widely used until the passage of the TRA55 and the issuance of a 1988 revenue ruling
providing that Wyoming LLCs would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes. 56
Therefore, few court decisions address whether LLC operating agreements are
executory contracts.57
Limited partnerships and general partnerships have a more complex history
than LLCs.58 Courts have generally held that partnership agreements are executory
contracts.59 However, these courts have either summarily accepted the executory
contract characterization or they have found that the limited partnership agreement
is not an executory contract when the partners have continuing financial
obligations.60 Because LLC operating agreements, like partnership agreements,
delegate administrative and financial responsibilities to members, the apparent trend
among bankruptcy courts is to treat operating agreements in the same manner as


54

See Larry E. Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here? A History and Prognosis, 13 BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 11-13, for a brief history of the limited liability company.
55

The Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act was codified in 1977 as WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15101-136. Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A
Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 523
n.2 (1988). See pages 523-24 for an extended discussion of the Wyoming Limited Liability Company
Act.

56

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).

57

Endeka Enters., LLC v. Meiburger (In re Tsiaoushis), No. 1:07cv436, 2007 WL 2156162, at *2 (E.D.
Va. July 19, 2007).

58

See Mitchell A. Stephens, Comment, A Trap for the Rational: Simultaneous Removal and Appointment of a
General Partner Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 521, 522-26 (2007),
for a discussion of the development of the law of limited partnerships.
59

In re Daugherty Const. Inc., 188 B.R. 607, 612 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); Cutler v. Cutler (In re Cutler),
165 B.R. 275, 279-80 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).

60

Samson v. Prokopf (In re Smith), 185 B.R. 285, 292-93 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1995).
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partnership agreements.61 However, despite this trend, some courts still decline to
hold that an operating agreement is an executory contract.62 Courts have also
considered whether the remaining obligation of the member to the company is
material.63
The foregoing material illustrates that whether an operating agreement will
be considered an executory contract depends on whether there are continuing
obligations of the members. In addition, the presence of continuing fiduciary
obligations between members increases the likelihood that that the court will find the
operating agreement to be an executory contract that the debtor may assume or
reject. Alternatively, if the non-profit organization has very few continuing
obligations under the operating agreement—for example because the only remaining
obligations are those of the for-profit organization—there is a distinct possibility the
operating agreement will not be considered an executory contract. However, if the
allocation of the LIHTC was from the non-profit set-aside, as previously described
in the fact pattern, and the project was still within the 15-year compliance period, the
argument that there are few continuing obligations is inconsistent with the
requirement for the non-profit organization’s material participation.64 In such an
instance, it is very likely that the operating agreement will be deemed an executory
contract.


61

Milford Power Co., LLC v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738, 750 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004); see
also Thomas F. Blakemore, Limited Liability Companies and the Bankruptcy Code: A Technical Review, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 12, 52 (1994).
62

See In re Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Corp., 341 B.R. 632, 636-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding
that an operating agreement was non-executory since there were no present obligations of the
members and the future obligations were contingent on uncertain events.); In re Garrison-Ashburn,
L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 708-09 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that an operating agreement was not an
executory agreement since it only provided for the structure of the management of the limited liability
company and set forth no additional responsibilities or duties of the members such as providing
capital or participating in management).

63

See, e.g., Movitz v. Fiesta Invs., LLC (In re Ehmann), 319 B.R. 200, 204 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005)
(holding “[a] member’s obligation must be so material that if the member did not perform it,
[defendant LLC] would owe no further obligations to that member”).

64

See supra note 29.
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IS THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL PROVISION IN THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT ENFORCEABLE?

If an operating agreement is determined to be an executory contract, and the
debtor, in order to sell its interests in the general partner LLC, opts to assume and
assign the operating agreement to a third party purchaser, the debtor may be able to
avoid the mandates of the right of first refusal contained therein if the court holds
that the right of first refusal is effectively an unenforceable restriction on
assignment.65 If, alternatively, the operating agreement is not deemed an executory
contact, or it is an executory contact the debtor chooses to assume (such that the
issue of non-assignability is not an issue),66 in order for the debtor to exercise its right
to sell the interest in the general partner, the court will likely have to respect the right
of first refusal provision contained therein.67 Further, if the court determines that
the right of first refusal is a separate and material bargained-for provision in the
operating agreement, the court will likely respect the provision.68 Likewise, if the

65Generally,

contracts that limit the debtor’s ability to assign an executory contact are unenforceable in
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2006). The exception to this rule is that if the applicable
bankruptcy law would excuse a non-debtor party from accepting performance from anyone other
than the debtor, then the bankruptcy court should give the same effect to the contract in bankruptcy
under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(c)(1), 365(e)(1) (2006); see also Endeka Enters., LLC. v.
Meiburger (In re Tsiaoushis), 2007 WL 2156162, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 19, 2007); In re Garrison-Ashburn,
L.C., 253 B.R. at 709; Endeka Enters., LLC v. Meiburger (In re Tsiaoushis), 383 B.R. 616, 619-21
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
66

See Northrop Grumman Technical Servs., Inc. v. The Show Group, Inc. (In re The IT Group, Inc.,
Co.), 302 B.R. 483, 488 (D. Del. 2003) (determining that “the right of first refusal is not an
unenforceable restraint on assignment. . . . courts have enforced rights of first refusal in the
bankruptcy context”).
67

Note that the majority of cases addressing the right of first refusal concept have been decided in the
context of a real property option agreement. See, e.g., In re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 289
B.R. 45, 51 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that the lessor’s right of first refusal was material and a
bargained-for element of the lease and that the lessor would not receive its full benefit of the bargain
without the right remaining in the lease); see also In re Todd, 118 B.R. 432, 435 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989)
(holding that a partner’s right under the partnership agreement and state law to match the sales price
offered by a third party for the debtor’s partnership interest was enforceable in bankruptcy). But see In
re Adelphia Comms. Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the right of first
refusal was an unenforceable non-assignment clause).

68

See, e.g., In re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, 289 B.R. at 51.
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right of first refusal is a separate agreement that was bargained for, the same analysis
applies.69
The question thus becomes how to best incorporate the right into the
bidding and sale procedures for the interest “in a fair and equitable manner that still
allows for the maximization of the value of the estate.”70 The court will ultimately
consider, however, what is in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate, and, if the
right of first refusal is not consistent with those interests, there is a greater chance
the court will not enforce that right against the debtor in bankruptcy.71
With respect to the right of first refusal, the best practical result is that the
for-profit organization will be given the opportunity to “match” the highest offer
received by the debtor in the sale of its assets. This would allow the for-profit
organization to control a subsequent transfer to another non-profit organization,
thereby allowing it to choose its partner and preserve the LIHTC by replacing the
original qualifying non-profit organization with a new qualifying non-profit
organization. On the other hand, the worst result would be that the right of first
refusal provision is held to be an unenforceable non-assignment provision or a
separate or severable contract that the debtor can reject. In that instance, the debtor
would have the ability and authority to sell its interest to a third party. Thus the forprofit organization would not have a partner of its choosing and would be in a
position of potential non-compliance with Section 42, possibly resulting in potential
recapture of some or all of the LIHTC. In either case, the for-profit organization
would have difficulty utilizing the right of first refusal to block the debtor from
selling its interest in the general partner entity.

VIII.

IS THE OPTION PROVISION IN THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
ENFORCEABLE?

In considering option agreements and whether they are executory contracts
within the meaning of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, courts have generally


69

See, e.g., In re Todd, 118 B.R. at 435.

70

In re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, 289 B.R. at 51 (finding that numerous courts have recognized a
right of first refusal and that the practical concern therewith is “not whether to enforce such [a] right,
but how to incorporate [the] right . . . into the bidding and sale procedure”).

71

See, e.g., In re Adelphia Comms. Corp., 359 B.R. at 85-86.
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applied the Countryman and functional approaches in finding in the affirmative.72
Alternatively, there are instances where courts held that an option was not executory
in nature, for example when the option was deemed “a unilateral option contract
requiring no further performance by either party unless [the debtor] seeks to exercise
[the] option,”73 when there were no material obligations owed the debtor under a
stock option agreement,74 and when the option agreement had been substantially
performed with the only task remaining being the clerical act of the actual issuance
of a stock certificate.75 However, a large majority of cases addressing this issue arise
in the context of a real property purchase option agreement, rather than a purchase
of interests in an LLC or limited partnership.76 As with the right of first refusal, the
structure of the agreement, including whether independent consideration was given
for the option and whether the option was exercised, is a factor taken into account in
determining whether the option is an executory contract.77
The analysis regarding how the option will be treated when the provisions
are contained in the operating agreement is similar to the right of first refusal
discussion above. If the option is contained in a separate agreement, it is likely to be
considered an executory contract, particularly if the option has not been exercised as
of the date the partner or member files for bankruptcy. Courts are apt to come to
this conclusion because, at that time, the obligations of both parties to the agreement
are materially underperformed. In such event, the debtor will have the authority to
reject or assume the contract using the business judgment rule.78

72

See In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 423-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1997); In re West Chestnut Realty of
Haverford, Inc., 177 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Hardie, 100 B.R. 284, 287 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989) (holding that an unexercised purchase option constituted an executory contract
subject to rejection by the debtor).
73

BNY, Capital Funding LLC v. US Airways, Inc., 345 B.R. 549, 552 (E.D. Va. 2006) (regarding a
letter of intent).

74

In re Am. West Airlines, Inc., 179 B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995).

75

Wootton v. Young Family Trust (In re Dixon), 990 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1993).

76

See, e.g., In re Adelphia Comms. Corp., 359 B.R. at 66; In re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, 289 B.R. at 51; In
re Todd, 188 B.R. at 435.

77
78

See In re III Enters., Inc., 163 B.R. 453, 461-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).

In re Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 316 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the business judgment rule, a
debtor is presumed to have made its decision in the best interests of the estate, and the court will only
disturb the decision upon a showing that the debtor is acting in a manner that would be detrimental to
the estate. Id.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, relief from the automatic stay would also be
necessary. Assuming relief from stay is available, in determining whether to assume
such an agreement, the debtor would be guided by what is best for the bankruptcy
estate, and the court would likely approve any such decision under the business
judgment rule.79 Therefore, if allowing the exercise of the option would give the
debtor a market rate or better for the interests (or would result in a net better result
after giving effect to any claims that would be made against the estate for recapture
costs), the debtor would assume the contract, subject to all the burdens therein.80
Alternatively, if by rejecting the option agreement, the debtor could sell the interests
for a higher price than would be available under the option, then the court would
likely approve a decision by the debtor to reject the option agreement. As with the
right of first refusal, once the agreement is rejected, the other partner or member
would have a rejection damages claim in the bankruptcy filing.81 This means that the
other partner or member would have a prepetition unsecured claim against the
debtor for monetary damages such that it would be entitled to recover under the
option agreement pursuant to state law.

IX.

CONCLUSION

With respect to operating agreements, the right of first refusal, and option
agreements, it is difficult to determine whether a court would deem them executory
contracts. If, as determined by a court, they are not executory, the other partner or
member may be able to preserve its rights to purchase the debtor’s interest. In such
event, the other partner or member should be able to protect against recapture of tax
credits. If, however, the court determines that the agreements are executory, the
other partner or member has several options: (i) file a claim against the bankruptcy
estate for losses from any recapture event, (ii) contact the applicable state agency
(and IRS) regarding relief from recapture, and (iii) consider whether a qualified nonprofit can be admitted by the sale of a portion of the other partner or member’s
interest or of the investor’s interest.82

79

Id.

80

See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).

81

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006).

82

The sale of a portion of the investor’s interest would reduce its percentage interest in the LIHTC
but the loss may be less than the recapture event, in which case such a sale might be preferable.
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As noted above, some agreements provide for below market prices in these
provisions, and, in a bankruptcy, such provisions likely would be determined not to
be in the best interests of the estate. Likewise, even a fair market value appraisal may
be less than the price that a debtor might receive from a third party. However,
partnership interests and membership interests generally do not have a large market
of purchasers as one would find with other types of security, such as a stock traded
on a stock exchange, and prices tend to reflect this non-marketability factor, among
others.
One possible provision in these agreements that might bolster the chances
that these provisions would be accepted by the court would be a “matching” pricing
structure that overrides the other pricing in the event of a bankruptcy. A practical
issue with this type of provision is that, like the right of first refusal, the provision
may have a chilling effect on bids, since any potential purchaser knows it is unlikely
to win the bid since there is another party that has the final right to match the price.
With this chilling effect in mind, a matching proxy structure may have little practical
value.
Therefore, in drafting such provisions, legal counsel should consider the
potential effects of a bankruptcy filing by a partner and discuss the possible
ramifications with their clients. Depending on the jurisdiction, the outcome will be
determined by applicable case law. Moreover, while it is possible that the agreements
will be determined to be executory in nature and, therefore, will potentially be
rejected in a bankruptcy filing, the provisions are valuable prior to such filing, and, if
drafted with care, may be valuable in the event a bankruptcy filing occurs during the
term of the agreement.

